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THE PREFACE AND FIRST CHAPTER OF WORD & OBJECT 
Introduction 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, 
primarily as it is presented in Word & Object (1960). This interpretation will be based on a close 
reading of the first two chapters of Word & Object, with occasional supplementation from Quine’s 
other works. The purpose of this reading is to isolate the material from these two chapters that are 
most important in understanding the indeterminacy thesis. Much of what Quine says, especially in the 
second chapter, is not entirely necessary for appreciating his arguments. Quine simply found certain 
concepts “worthy of treatment on their own account” (p. 27). It will therefore be helpful to filter out 
the excess as much as is possible.  
 It is my hope that this reading can serve a two-fold purpose. The first is that it will be able to 
serve as an introduction to Quine’s indeterminacy thesis for philosophically competent readers who 
have, for some reason or other, not yet become familiar with Quine’s work. An unfortunate side effect 
of Quine’s highly systematic approach to philosophy is that it is often quite difficult to fully grasp his 
work when reading only a handful of selections. A lengthy and detailed study is required. This thesis, 
then, can perhaps be thought of as a shortcut.  
 The second purpose of this thesis is to set aright some confusions that have persisted 
concerning Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, even among those who are quite familiar with a great deal 
of Quine’s work. I wish to clarify these confusions that seem to have been disseminated by those who 
2 
 
are not open to Quine’s work. As we will see in the final chapter, even one of the most able 
philosophers of our time exhibits a serious difficulty in wrestling with Quine’s deeply counter-
intuitive views. It is quite rare to come across interpretations of Quine that are sympathetic, and even 
more rare for accounts that are accurate. I believe that a solid understanding of Quine is incredibly 
difficult without an account that demonstrates both f these qualities to serve as a guide. It is my hope 
to eventually construct such a guide, and this is my first step towards that goal.  
Here, then, is the direction of our investigation. We shall begin with a detailed reading of the 
preface and the first two chapters of Word & Object, breaking down each chapter within Quine’s 
designated sections. We will then consider some comm n criticisms of the indeterminacy thesis, and 
attempt to apply our interpretation to these criticisms. Finally, we will examine John Searle’s 
criticisms of the indeterminacy thesis, which represents, to a certain extent, the kind of “common 
sense” reaction that many readers of Quine are likely to have. It is thus important to guard against the 
kind of arguments employed by Searle.  
Preface 
 While the preface of many books may be something that can easily be skipped or 
overlooked without serious loss in understanding of the main text, the preface of Word & Object 
is not that kind of preface. In this preface, Quine sets the foundation for the entire rest of the 
book, and he accomplishes this task in only the first two paragraphs. (The vast majority of the 
preface is, of course, dedicated to acknowledgements.) As one reads through the body of Word & 
Object, it is quite difficult to avoid getting lost in the density of Quine’s writing. So it may be 
helpful (perhaps even necessary) to periodically remind oneself of what Quine says in the preface 
as one reads through the text.  
 Realizing the full implications of what Quine says in the preface puts the overall 
argument of Word & Object in a much clearer light. The preface provides a context that makes 
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the seemingly "extreme" conclusions of the book seem much more plausible (or, at the very least, 
the conclusions arrived at don't seem quite as strange, given the starting point of the arguments).  
 The most important theme of the preface (and by extension the entire book) is stated in 
the very first sentence: "Language is a social art" (p. ix). Like a good magician, by the time you 
realize that the magic trick has started, the switch has already been made. The major points on 
which Quine relies throughout his argument can essentially be traced back to this very first 
sentence. The claim that language is social seems so obvious and mundane as to hardly need 
stating at all. (Just a regular deck of cards, yes?) But the implications that Quine draws out from 
this ordinary statement are anything but trivial.  
 The social and public nature of language entails, ccording to Quine, that all linguistic 
meaning must ultimately be learned via the environme t and observable behavior. This claim is 
reminiscent of the classical empiricist thesis thatall knowledge must be ultimately traced back to 
some basic element of sense experience. (Indeed, I would argue that Quine's understanding of 
language is essentially just a linguistic version of this thesis, although this is not a topic that will
be further investigated here.) This claim is also reminiscent of the kind of psychological 
behaviorism which has its roots in B.F. Skinner's work in psychology. Although Quine was 
apparently a close personal acquaintance of Skinner, I will argue that Quine's behaviorism is not 
of the same kind as Skinner's. Quine's behavorism is a linguistic thesis, not a psychological one. 
More will be said about this distinction later.  
 Quine also argues that the social nature of language results in a "systematic 
indeterminacy" (p. ix) of both the meanings of sentences and the references of terms. Quine's 
discussion of indeterminacy largely takes place within he context of his "radical translation" 
thought experiment in Chapter 2. However, as I shall argue in later chapters, the important point 
to take away from this discussion is not just that e translation of sentences between one's native 
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language and a radically foreign language is bogged down in an irresolvable indeterminacy. 
Rather, it is that this inter-linguistic indeterminacy reflects a deeper instability within the notion 
of linguistic meaning generally, even when restricted to one's own native language. The radical 
translation scenario is simply an easier scenario to accept, so it is useful as an initial presentation. 
What radical translation illustrates is that there a  serious theoretical problems that result from 
relying on an "uncritical mentalism," as Quine would later say. (Quine 1970a, p. 5) The radical 
translation thought experiment will be discussed in etail in the second chapter of this thesis.  
 Finally, in the preface Quine also alludes to what would later come to be known as his 
peculiar brand of naturalism, as well as his holism. These two ideas, combined with his unique 
style of behaviorism, do all of the "heavy lifting" when it comes to Quine's arguments in Word & 
Object. These views are the important points that Quine teases out from his opening sentence: 
"Language is a social art" (p. ix). These three views are obviously very important to his argument 
in this text, as well as his overall philosophical project. It is practically impossible to understand 
what Quine is up to in this book without some awareness of these basic positions. Thus, special 




Quine begins §1 by emphasizing what may be called th  ‘physicality of discourse.’ Words 
denoting observable physical objects are the easiest to learn. Talk of physical objects is quite 
clear when compared to, say, the abstract objects of mathematics. We begin with “ordinary 
things,” as the title of the section indicates. These ordinary things are physical objects, and our 
talk of physical objects is “about as basic as langu ge gets” (p. 3). Our physical language is the 
entrance point for learning language, so it is no wonder that it is also the most clearly understood.  
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 In §1 Quine mentions Otto Neurath’s well-known metaphor for science as a boat: 
“Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by 
plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat” (p. 3). 
Here is where Quine establishes two of his crucial positions for his arguments throughout Word 
& Object. Neurath’s boat metaphor, to which Quine appeals again in this book as well as in other 
writings, is an endorsement of epistemological holism. Quine is denying the possibility of any 
kind of foundationalist structure for human knowledg . One does not build a system of 
knowledge on some unshakeable foundation, for there is no such thing. Rather, we must 
continuously make piecemeal adjustments to various parts of our knowledge base as we discover 
gaps, inconsistencies, or falsehoods in our system. (Or, to return to the metaphor, we plug leaks 
and replace weak planks as we find them.)  
Notice, though, that Quine is going one step further an Neurath. Neurath, in agreement with 
many of his logical positivist colleagues, took a strongly anti-metaphysical position, pushing for a 
reformulation of all significant language into verifiable scientific claims. Everything that cannot 
be formulated in this way (i.e., metaphysical claims) was dismissed as nonsense. But Quine does 
not share this view. Similar to how he rejected the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
sentences, Quine also rejected the idea of any kind of strict demarcation between science and 
philosophy, metaphysics included. So when Quine employs Neurath’s metaphor, he is not just 
talking about science: “The philosopher and the scintist are in the same boat.” (p. 3) Philosophy, 
then, is of a piece with natural science. Quine considers the two not as separate and independent 
disciplines. Rather, he argues that philosophy “…as an effort to get clearer on things, is not to be 
distinguished in essential points of purpose and method from good and bad science” (p. 3-4). 
Here we see Quine committing to the position that he would later refer to as his naturalism.  
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Quine’s version of naturalism is a rather unique on. As he presents it here, it contains two 
central claims. The first, which has already been mtioned, is the insistence that philosophy and 
science are continuous. The second is that all theorizing, whether it leans toward philosophy or 
science, must take place within some particular theoretical position, employing some conceptual 
scheme. There is no a priori position from which the philosopher can examine and ppraise our 
conceptual schemes, our systems of knowledge, without being immersed in a particular 
conceptual scheme as well. The following quotes illu trate this latter point well:  
…our questioning of objects can coherently begin only i  relation to a system of 
theory which is itself predicated on our interim acceptances of objects… 
No inquiry being possible without some conceptual scheme, we may as well retain 
and use the best one we know—right down to the latest d tail of quantum mechanics, 
if we know it and it matters. (p. 4) 
 
It is due to the truth of naturalism, Quine argues, that we must begin our philosophizing (and 
scientific theorizing) in the “middle”: “Analyze theory-building how we will, we all must start in 
the middle. Our conceptual firsts are middle-sized, middle-distanced objects, and our introduction 
to them and to everything comes midway in the cultura  evolution of the race” (p. 4-5).  
In an interesting bit of symmetry, Quine begins §1 with a point about our language of 
physical objects, and then closes this section by proposing to examine this language itself as a 
physical feature of the physical world: “I propose in this introductory chapter to ponder our talk 
of physical phenomena as a physical phenomenon, and our scientific imaginings as activities 
within the world that we imagine” (p. 5). Perhaps it is partly due to forgetfulness of this fact that 
we ever ended up with an analytic-synthetic distinctio  in the first place. After all, what sense is 
there to be made of a distinction between truth due to language and truth due to empirical fact 





In §2, Quine begins to discuss the importance of the objective world in grounding even our 
most subjective references. Quine uses the examples of ‘Ouch’ and ‘Red’, considered as one-
word sentences (the importance of conceiving of such utterances as one-word sentences and not 
as referring singular terms will be made clear in our discussion of Ch. 2). We are trained in the 
employment of these kinds of utterances in social contexts. We must observe our environment 
and the behavior of others. Even with words like ‘ouch’, where the pain is only felt by one 
person, we are trained to use this word by others who do not share our pain; and we learn how the 
word is used from others whose pain we do not share:  
Society, acting solely on overt manifestations, has been able to train the individual to 
say the socially proper thing in response even to socially undetectable stimulations. 
The trick has depended on prior concomitances between covert stimulation and overt 
behaviour, notably the wincing instinct. (p. 5-6) 
A brief digression is necessary at this point to address an assumption on which Quine 
depends in his discussion of language learning. That assumption is Quine’s particular brand of 
behaviorism. Many have confused Quine’s behaviorism with B.F. Skinner’s behaviorism, 
although it is not clear that they can be entirely blamed for this. While Quine was a close friend 
and a colleague of Skinner’s, Quine did not inherit his behaviorism from him. Quine admits to 
having been a behaviorist long before he and Skinner ev r met. Indeed, Quine claims to have 
become a behaviorist sometime in the 1920s, pointing to his undergraduate readings of John B. 
Watson’s Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist and Rudolf Carnap’s Psychologie in 
physikalischer Sprache as his main inspirations (Quine 2008). However, these two sources may 
not be sufficiently unlike Skinner’s understanding of behaviorism, so more explanation is needed 
to differentiate Quine’s position from Skinner’s.  
Recent articles by Tyrus Fisher (2011) and Dagfinn Føllesdal (2011) have defended Quine’s 
behaviorism, arguing that his particular brand is immune to the traditional objections levelled at 
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Skinner and his ilk, and that it is a rather plausible and relatively innocuous doctrine in Quine’s 
hands. The most important point to remember when discussing Quine’s behaviorism is that it is 
not a psychological thesis. Rather, it is a methodological imperative for the study of language:  
In psychology one may or may not be a behaviorist, bu  in linguistics one has no 
choice. Each of us learns his language by observing other people’s verbal behavior 
and having his own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by 
others. We depend strictly on overt behavior in observable situations… There is 
nothing in linguistic meaning, then, beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior 
in observable circumstances. (Quine 1987, p. 5) 
Thus, in arguing for the indeterminacy of translation, Quine does not seek to deny the existence 
of mental life. (However, in other papers unrelated to the topic of indeterminacy, he does 
repudiate certain “mental entities” [Quine 1953 & 1985].) He is arguing that what goes on in our 
essentially private mental lives is simply irrelevant to any discussion of linguistic meaning. One 
does not need to deny the existence of our psychological inner lives in order to accept the 
indeterminacy of translation. Rather, one must simply recognize the evidential (epistemological) 
constraints on any empirical study of language.  
 With this point behind us, we can now return to Quine’s discussion of language learning. 
We saw how observations of the objective world are what unifies our language for our internal 
experiences. Quine goes further in his praise of objectivity, noting that it is our reliance on 
reference to objective features of our environment which holds language together, as it were. The 
establishment of a uniform language over a considerabl  number of speakers depends on our 
tendency to focus on socially observable circumstances, what Quine calls the “objective pull.” So 
despite the “chaotic subjective diversity” (p. 8) of our inner lives and personal histories which 
exhibit such wild variation in how each of us, as individuals, come to learn our languages, we 
nevertheless end up with the ability to communicate wi h one another quite easily and efficiently. 
Quine closes this section with a particularly apt me aphor: 
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Different persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed 
and trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs 
and branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to bush, but the 
overall outward results are alike. (p. 8)  
§3 
 As he confronts the notion of the difference betwen learning words and learning 
sentences, Quine compares his situation with that of Hume when he inquired into how it is that 
we learn new ideas. Since Quine is suspicious of the scientific credentials of a word like ‘idea’, 
he instead offers a linguistic formation of Hume’s problem, offering that this problem “may often 
be by-passed by representing the words in question imply as fragments of sentence which were 
learned as wholes” (p. 9). So words like ‘ouch’, ‘red’, or ‘rabbit’ can best be thought of as one-
word sentences.  
 Sentences are learned, Quine claims, in three ways: 
(1) direct conditioning of a sentence with some non-verbal stimulation; 
(2) “analogical synthesis” (p. 9), which consists in sub tituting certain words in sentences 
that were previously learned as wholes in response to timulations that are similar to the 
contexts in which the original sentences were learnd; 
(3) the “interanimation of sentences” (p. 9), which consists in the association of sentences 
with other sentences, rather than with non-verbal stimulation.  
Of these three, (1) is clearly the most basic form f language learning, and it is the starting point 
for infants as well as our linguist who is engaged in radical translation, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. It is only after some significant traction n the language has been gained that one moves 
up to the next two forms of sentence-learning.  
 It is within this third method of sentence-learning that the basic skills are developed 
which we employ in the construction of theories. Quine offers up the idea that theories should be 
conceived of as being composed of sentences. Some of th se sentences are directly linked to 
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experience (observation sentences), and some are only linked to other sentences, such as 
statements about logic, mathematics, or highly abstr ct parts of physics. Still others serve to 
mediate between these latter sentences, most removed fr m experience, and those that are the 
simplest and most immediate reports of experience. Th  observation sentences are linked to 
certain theoretical sentences, which are then linked to our patterns of response: “…the verbal 
network of an articulate theory has intervened to link the stimulus with the response. The 
intervening theory is composed of sentences associated with one another in multifarious ways not 
easily reconstructed even in conjecture” (p. 11).  
At this point we see Quine picking up where he left off in his 1951 paper “Two Dogmas of 
Logical Empiricism.” In that essay, Quine commits to what Roger Gibson has called an “extreme 
holism” (Gibson 2000, p. 81). Quine argued that all of “our statements about the external world 
face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (Quine 1951, 
p. 38). This formulation of Quine’s holism was rightly taken as a strange and obviously false 
view. After all, how can we seriously suggest that every single mundane experience of our daily 
lives essentially serves as a potentially devastating test of our entire wealth of scientific 
knowledge? It does not seem plausible, for instance, that an observation of an ordinary rabbit in a 
field on a summer afternoon could be connected by any relevant path of linked sentences to 
statements about quantum mechanics. Quine was sensitiv  to objections of this kind, so he 
adjusted his view accordingly, arriving at what Gibson calls “moderate holism” (Gibson 2000, p. 
82). Moderate holism accounts for the fact that not every single piece of knowledge is potentially 
called into question in the event of some unexpected observation. Rather, only a certain “chunk” 
of theory is threatened. However, Quine remains committed to the holist view that, at least in 
principle, every single sentence of the entirety of our knowledge is a possible candidate for 
revision in the event of some possible recalcitrant experience:  
In an obvious way this structure of interconnected sentences is a single fabric 
including all sciences, and indeed everything we evr say about the world; for the 
logical truths at least, and no doubt many more comm nplace sentences too, are 
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germane to all topics and thus provide connections. However, some middle-sized 
scrap of theory usually will embody all the connections that are likely to affect our 
adjudication of a given sentence. (p. 12-13) 
 
Note that in this section, Quine is also clarifying his use of the term ‘theory,’ emphasizing that he 
is not only referring to what may be strictly called a ‘scientific theory,’ but also to what we might 
call knowledge, broadly construed:  
Theory may be deliberate, as in a chapter on chemistry, or it may be second nature, as 
is the immemorial doctrine of ordinary enduring middle-sized objects. In either case, 
theory causes a sharing, by sentences, of sensory supports. 
 
§4 
This section includes material that is important for Quine’s overall project in Word & Object, 
but it is not necessary for understanding the indeterminacy of translation. Thus, we can move on 
to the next section.  
§5 
Quine spends the first half of this section discussing points that reiterate his behaviorism and 
holism. He uses these points as the foundation of his discussion of considerations for how 
evidence for our theory should be weighted and evaluated. These evidential considerations, once 
again, are not necessary for understanding the indeterminacy of translation. However, it may well 
be worth revisiting behaviorism and holism again.  
…words only mean as their use in sentences is conditi ed to sensory stimuli, verbal and 
otherwise. Any realistic theory of evidence must be inseparable from the psychology of 
stimulus and response, applied to sentences. (p. 17) 
 
This is a crucial passage in Word & Object, despite the fact that it appears, at first glance, to 
be not much more than a passing remark in a transitory paragraph between more substantial 
discussions of learning words and weighing evidence. But a careful reading of this chapter 
reveals that this is Quine’s first mention of linguistic meaning. Meaning, as we shall see next 
chapter, is the central focus of Quine’s discussion of the indeterminacy of translation, just as it 




As we break down this remark, we notice that Quine is treating the sentence as the primary 
vehicle of meaning, rather than the individual word. As noted earlier, this is an important point 
for the next chapter. We shall see that keeping this notion in mind can help us to avoid a very 
common misunderstanding of the conjecture of indeterminacy of translation, a misunderstanding 
that is largely due to a lack of clarity and precision in Quine’s early discussions of this issue. 
Quine seems to have perceived this problem in his later re-visitations to indeterminacy (Quine 
1970a, p. 178; Quine 1987, p. 8-9).  
Returning to meaning, then, we can see that Quine th ks that a word gains its meaning by 
being used in a sentence, and a sentence gains its meaning by being a part of the “single fabric” 
(p. 12) of our total system of knowledge (via his holism). How we construct our total theory of 
the world, in turn, depends on what weight we give to certain evidential norms, such as simplicity 
and conservatism. However we rank these considerations, Quine argues, what is most important 
is that our theory of evidence respect the methodological constraints imposed by the linguistic 
behaviorism he has been developing throughout this chapter.  
§6 
 In this final section of the first chapter of Word & Object, it is important to notice a 
particular passage, which will help us guard against a other potential misunderstanding of 
Quine’s views that seems, once again, to be the result of Quine’s own somewhat ambiguous 
writing.  
After spending some time explaining the under-determination of theory by evidence, Quine 
uses this concept to introduce us to the indeterminacy of translation. The problem with this choice 
is that it seems to have led some philosophers to believe that the indeterminacy of translation is 
simply a special case of the under-determination of theory by evidence, where entire languages 
are treated as separate chunks of theory (See Rorty1972, Chomsky 1969, and also Gaudet 2006). 
Quine also further exacerbated this misunderstanding by again relying heavily on under-
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determination in his illustration of indeterminacy in his 1970 paper “On the Reasons for 
Indeterminacy of Translation.”  
If we set aside most of the discussion of under-determination in this section, however, and 
simply focus on one particular passage, it may apper that Quine is trying to differentiate the 
indeterminacy of translation from the under-determination of theory by evidence: 
If there were (contrary to what we just concluded) an unknown but unique best total 
systematization θ of science conformable to the past, present, and future nerve-hits of 
mankind, so that we might define the whole truth as that unknown θ, still we should 
not thereby have defined truth for actual single sentences. We could not say, 
derivatively, that any single sentence S is true if it or a translation belongs to θ, for 
there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory θ with a sentence S
given apart from θ. Unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory 
stimulation, a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its own theory; 
meaningless intertheoretically. (p. 23-24) 
 
When one recalls that Quine uses the term ‘theory’ (as well as ‘science’) in a quite broad sense, it 
becomes clear that this is essentially equivalent to his statement of the indeterminacy of 
translation in the next chapter. We can regard Quine’s use of the term ‘theory’ as referring to a 
language. After all, Quine has already committed to the view that a theory is composed of 
sentences, just as a language is. Thus, in the quot ab ve, Quine is saying that there is no 
uniquely correct translation of a sentence in one la guage to a sentence in another language. 
Furthermore, by contrasting this concept with that of under-determination, Quine is attempting to 
show how we should not regard one as a special case of th  other (even though, historically 
speaking, he seems to have failed in that task). Even if we had a unique, complete, and perfect 
global scientific theory, capable of predicting or explaining any and all observations at any point 
in time, this would still not be sufficient for establishing a unique translation of a sentence from 
one language into another. In other words, even if there were no under-determination at all, there 






THE SECOND CHAPTER OF WORD & OBJECT 
Now we must turn to an examination of Chapter 2 of W rd & Object. It is here where the bulk of 
the material that directly concerns Quine’s argument for the indeterminacy of translation 
apparently resides. But this is merely apparent. As I emphasized in the commentary on the 
preface, the pieces of the argument have all been assembled prior to this chapter. Quine’s only 
real task in this chapter is to tease out the implications of what has already been said, and to tidy 
up a few potential loose ends.  
For Quine, it is a commitment to philosophizing in a scientifically respectable way that 
ultimately leads to the indeterminacy thesis. Science tells us that as human beings, we only have 
five senses. Thus science establishes empiricism, insofar as there is no evidence for any as of yet 
undiscovered form of extrasensory perception. Thus all that we know, or take ourselves to know, 
must ultimately be rooted somehow in our sensory peceptions, or “stimulations” as Quine calls 
them throughout this chapter. Quine would later formulate his empiricism as follows: 
“…whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence” and “…all inculcation of 
meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence” (Quine 1969a, p. 75).  
Thus, recognizing the truth of empiricism requires that we accept a behavioristic account 
of linguistic meaning, since there is no way that infants and toddlers could begin to learn 
language except, ultimately, through connecting certain sensory stimulations with others via basic 
stimulus-and-response conditioning. The complexity of these connections, of course, increases  
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greatly over time, as language-learners transcend the basic method of ostensive direct 
conditioning (See §3).  
The way that these connections are structured is where Quine’s holism comes into play. 
The way that one systematizes experience is not uniquely determined by those sensory 
stimulations. There are vastly different ways of constructing our theoretical sentences such that 
they are equally faithful to our sensory experience: th y explain all our past and present 
stimulations, and they predict all the same future stimulations. But they are incompatible in terms 
of content of the more theoretical sentences. This, of course, is holism in the global sense. Holism 
also shows itself locally. When a particular experiment does not produce the predicted result, we 
know that some assumption relevant to this situation is wrong. We do not know immediately 
which one, and we could, if we wished, pick one at random from this pool of relevant 
assumptions and deny it. Then we simply make adjustments elsewhere among our assumptions to 
accommodate the new changes to fit our systematization of past, present, and future stimulations. 
Quine’s focus on under-determination of theory by evid nce in the first chapter seems to have 
been his way of illustrating his holism, rather than using it to directly argue for indeterminacy of 
translation. Holism is only a part of the overall argument for indeterminacy. Rather, it primarily 
stems from his naturalism. 
Quine regards his naturalism as a result of some set of cientific findings (See §1 and §6). 
We must always theorize from within the standpoint f one particular theory or other. There is no 
a priori standpoint from which we can evaluate and judge competing theories, since all 
judgments, whether they are of the most highly theoretical statements or of the most direct reports 
of experience, rely on some conceptualizations or assumptions. It is impossible to completely 
separate ourselves from our inherited (or chosen) co ceptual scheme, construed in the broadest 
possible sense. We must always start “in the middle” of things, making adjustments to our 
conceptual scheme as needed. All of these considerations above naturally lead us to the point that 
16 
 
there is no sense at all to the idea of some kind of inter-linguistic meaning, a meaning that 
transcends any particular language and which is captured by a correct translation. 
Chapter 2 
§7 
 Quine begins §7 by setting the agenda for this chapter, and then providing the first few 
formulations of the indeterminacy thesis: “In this chapter we shall consider how much of 
language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions, and what scope this leaves for 
empirically unconditioned variation in one’s conceptual scheme” (p. 26). First Quine considers an 
“uncritical way” of representing the indeterminacy of meaning (I say ‘meaning’ here since only 
one language is involved in this formulation.): 
…two men could be just alike in all their dispositions to verbal behavior under all 
possible sensory stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed in their 
identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically, for 
the two men, in a wide range of cases. (p. 26) 
Quine then notes that this formulation may be viewed as meaningless: “one may protest that a 
distinction of meaning unreflected in the totality of dispositions to verbal behavior is a distinction 
without a difference” (p. 26). So Quine reformulates he point using terms from set theory:  
…the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker's language can be so 
permuted, or mapped onto itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker's dispositions to 
verbal behavior remains invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of 
sentences with equivalent sentences, in any plausible ense of equivalence however 
loose. (p. 27) 
Finally, Quine paraphrases this idea in terms of translation:  
…manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, 
all compatible with the totality of speech dispositi ns, yet incompatible with one 
another (p. 27) 
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It is worth noting that in the sentence that follows this one, Quine further clarifies the 
indeterminacy thesis by saying that it implies that two (or more) translation manuals will produce 
translations of a given sentence that “stand to each other in no plausible sort of equivalence 
however loose” (p. 27). The word ‘equivalence’ appears in both of the latter formulations of the 
indeterminacy thesis. Since the problem that ultimately underlies the indeterminacy of translation 
is our lack of an account of synonymy, or sameness of meaning, it might seem that Quine is, in 
effect, relying on something like a synonymy relation n his explication of indeterminacy. Quine 
himself apparently noticed this potential problem as he was writing Word & Object: “I disliked 
having to appeal thus to equivalence, however apologetically, in the very formulation of a thesis 
that casts doubt on the notions of translation or synonymy or equivalence” (Quine 1969b, p. 296-
297). But Quine also points out that later in the book, he manages to formulate the indeterminacy 
thesis without having to appeal to a notion such as equivalence:  
…rival systems of analytical hypotheses can conform to all speech dispositions 
within each of the languages concerned and yet dictate, in countless cases, utterly 
disparate translations; not mere mutual paraphrases, but translations each of which 
would be excluded by the other system of translation. (p. 73) 
 Next, Quine specifies how we should understand his use of the term ‘language’ 
throughout the radical translation thought experiment. “We are concerned here with language as 
the complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language 
have perforce come to resemble one another; not with the process of acquisition, whose variations 
from individual to individual it is to the interests of communication to efface.” (p. 27) This 
definition of language naturally leads to questions about drawing a distinction between what goes 
into learning language and what counts as “collateral information” (p. 27-28), but Quine 
postpones considerations of this kind for now. For now, Quine is content to consider “present 
dispositions to verbal behavior,” where our main cocern is how to construe the “modulus of the 
stimulation” (p. 28, italics in the original), or the duration of time of the stimulation which is to 
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count as relevant to the speaker’s response. Quine says that we can simply “consult our 
convenience” when setting the modulus, likely because the length of the relevant stimulation will 
vary dramatically depending on what it is the linguist is trying to translate.  
 Finally, we arrive at the thought experiment of radic l translation, which Quine uses as a 
helpful way to illustrate the indeterminacy of translation (for an interesting historical study of the
evolution of this thought experiment, see Quine’s [1937] and [1953] essays): 
The recovery of a man’s current language from his currently observed responses is 
the task of the linguist who, unaided by an interprter, is out to penetrate and translate 
a language hitherto unknown. All the objective data he has to go on are the forces 
that he sees impinging on the native’s surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal 
and otherwise, of the native. (p. 28) 
Here as well as throughout the rest of Quine’s discus ion of radical translation, he intentionally 
avoids direct reference to the environment from the perspective of the native. This is for two 
reasons. The first is that Quine is staying within t e limits of the behaviorism that he espouses. 
Behavior is the only game in town when it comes to linguistic meaning. The second is that the 
linguist, if he wants to create the best possible translations of the native’s language, will have to 
try to eliminate, as much as is possible, any bias th t he might inadvertently bring into the process 
of translation via the intrusion of features of hisown conceptual scheme. By focusing only on the 
objective data available to him, the linguist is able to build an understanding of the meaning of 
various native utterances on the only secure foundation vailable: direct conditioning to 
experience.  
 The easiest kinds of utterances to translate are the “ones keyed to present events that are 
conspicuous to the linguist and his informant” (p. 29). Hence we arrive at the well-known 
‘gavagai’ example. The field linguist and the native witness a rabbit running nearby, and the 
native volunteers the phrase ‘Gavagai.’ The linguist records the phrase, and guesses that ‘Rabbit’ 
or ‘Lo, a rabbit’ are possible suitable translations. The linguist will later utter ‘Gavagai?’ as a 
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question to the native (assuming the linguist has figured out the native’s interrogative inflection) 
under varying circumstances looking for assent, dissent, or neither reaction (again, assuming the 
linguist has figured out the native’s verbal and non-verbal signals for assent and dissent; Quine 
offers ‘Evet’ and ‘Yok’ as the native’s words for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.). The linguist will then have to 
try to make systematic sense of his results, eliminating intruding information in the environment 
as much as possible. If the linguist’s results seem to irror situations in which an English speaker 
would correspondingly assent or dissent to the query ‘Rabbit?’, then the linguist is gathering 
encouraging inductive evidence for ‘Rabbit’ as a translation of ‘Gavagai.’  
It is important to note two things at this point. The first is that “instead of speaking 
merely of stimulations under which the native will assent or dissent to the queried sentence, we 
speak in a more causal vein of stimulations that will prompt the native to assent or dissent to the 
queried sentence” (p. 30). What prompts the native’s utterance of ‘Gavagai’ (or his assent to the 
query ‘Gavagai?’) must be the “rabbit-presenting stimulations” and all others must prompt 
dissent. Quine then distinguishes between prompting and eliciting for our discussion of the 
radical translation: “What elicits the native's `Evet' or `Yok' is a combination: the prompting 
stimulation plus the ensuing query `Gavagai?'” (p. 30) The second point here is that Quine 
implicitly distinguishes between quotations of the native’s words and the native’s sentences 
through capitalization. Thus, ‘Gavagai’ is a sentence, and ‘gavagai’ is a term. As noted earlier, 
indeterminacy of translation applies to sentences, since sentences are the primary bearers of 
meaning. Indeterminacy of reference applies to terms alone. A failure to account for this subtle 
difference can lead to a serious misunderstanding of Quine’s use of the ‘gavagai’ example 






 Quine spends much of §8 developing the notion of a stimulation. Quine has been using 
this term throughout the book up to this point without really developing the concept in great 
detail. Since stimulations are the foundation of translation, of linguistic meaning in general, then 
it is appropriate to spend a good amount of time on them.  
 First, Quine follows up on a point that closed the last section. What prompts a native’s 
utterance of ‘Gavagai’ must be thought of as the stimulation, and not the rabbit itself. This way 
we can account for situations in which the native is prompted to utter ‘Gavagai’ when there isn’t 
a real rabbit present (e.g., hallucinations, artistic representations, etc.), and also for situations n 
which there is a rabbit present but the native, for some reason or other, fails to notice it.  
 Next, Quine provides a definition of visual stimulation as a “pattern of chromatic 
irradiation of the eye” (p. 31). Quine is a strict physicalist (see Quine 1953 & 1985), and 
ultimately identifies all mental states as physical st tes. So if we really do grasp such things as 
meanings in our minds, in our brains, then one might be tempted to draw on the resources of our 
internal neurophysiology to explain linguistic meaning. But this would be missing the point of the 
very first sentence of Word & Object: “Language is a social art” (p. ix). In learning language, we 
do not have access to another person’s private thoughts or neurophysiological states. These things 
are thus irrelevant to linguistic meaning. Only publicly observable evidence can possibly factor 
into meaning. In any case, even if such states of mind/brain were accessible, they would not be 
useful to the translator, since it is essential to language that individual idiosyncrasies in how 
language is learned and habits are formed are washed out. Communication must be uniform, but 
neurophysiology need not.  
 Still, we are left with this problem: how is it that we can compare stimulations between 
persons? How is it that the irritations by various physical forces on the sensory surfaces of the 
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native are supposed to be socially observable? Quine’s response is that such stimulations are 
“intersubjectively checked to some degree by society and linguist alike, by making allowances for 
the speaker’s orientation and the relative disposition of objects” (p. 31). In his later writings, 
Quine expands on this brief comment, citing the rolof empathy in translation, and language 
learning generally. (Quine 1992, p. 42ff.) The linguist is trying to project himself into the 
situation of the native without bringing along his own forms of concepts and biases. And it does 
not seem unreasonable that the linguist, who is standing right next to the native throughout his 
task of radical translation, would be able to reason bly guess how the physical forces would be 
affecting him if he were occupying the native’s location. (In Quine’s Pursuit of Truth and From 
Stimulus to Science, among other various articles, he made considerabl adjustments and updates 
to his concept of stimulations. Furthermore, in the pr face to the 2013 edition of Word and 
Object, Dagfinn Follesdal briefly describes some of Quine’s unrealized plans for a revised edition 
of the book, which involved significant changes to Quine’s original understanding of 
stimulation.)  
 The modulus of visual stimulations should not be viewed as “momentary static irradiation 
patterns”, but rather as “evolving irradiation patterns of all durations up to some convenient 
limit… Furthermore we may think of the ideal experimental situation as one in which the desired 
ocular exposure concerned is preceded and followed by a blindfold” (p. 31-32). In addition to this 
temporal window, Quine also specifies that a visual timulation should be treated in its “spatial 
entirety” (p. 32). Sometimes the subject’s entire vsual field is relevant for a given stimulus. 
Additionally, not all impacts of light on the retina will register a response, since many visual 
details are not actually processed outside of the area on which one is focused.  
 With these details about stimulations in place, Quine says that we have the ingredients 
needed to formulate a “crude concept of empirical meaning. For meaning, supposedly, is what a 
sentence shares with its translation; and translation at the present stage turns solely on 
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correlations with non-verbal stimulation” (p. 32). Quine then defines the affirmative stimulus 
meaning of a sentence as “the class of all the stimulations… that would prompt… assent” for a 
given speaker, and the negative stimulus meaning of a sentence as the class of all the stimulations 
that would prompt dissent for a given speaker (p. 32) Stimulus meaning, then, is defined as the 
ordered pair of the affirmative and negative stimulus meanings. So for the linguist to translate 
‘Gavagai’ as ‘Rabbit’ is to say that they have the same stimulus meaning. Stimulus meaning, 
Quine notes, must be contextualized not only to the modulus of the stimulations in question, but 
also to a given speaker at a given time, since speech patterns have a tendency to evolve, not only 
between individuals, but also within the same individual over time. “Fully ticketed, therefore, a 
stimulus meaning is the stimulus meaning modulo n seconds of sentence S for speaker a at time t” 
(p. 33). Of course, this account of stimulus meaning has only been explicitly laid out for visual 
stimulus meaning. An account of global stimulus meaning would require similar accounts for 
each of the other senses, such that the stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker at a time 
would include the total set of stimulations on all of the speaker’s sensory surfaces for the duration 
of the set modulus. Quine does not see the need to actually lay out this entire account, for its 
absence here will not affect his philosophical point in this chapter.  
 Quine takes a brief detour from his account of stimulations to ponder a particular word 
choice used in his definition of stimulus meaning: the strong conditional ‘would’. Quine explains 
that he uses this term in the sense of a disposition, such as when we explain the concept of 
solubility in water. Quine then identifies this sen of disposition as being “some subtle structural 
condition,” which Quine later clarifies as meaning a kind of not fully understood physical 
mechanism (Quine 1973, p. 8-15). So to say that a person would assent or dissent to a given 
sentence is simply to refer to whatever causal, physiological process occurs between stimulus and 
response. The exact details of this process, as Quine has stressed in the first chapter, are not 
directly relevant to accounting for linguistic meaning. 
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 Returning to the discussion of stimulations, Quine says that stimulations should not be 
understood as unique, particular events in time, but rather as “a universal, a repeatable event 
form” (p. 34). Hence we do not compare the qualitative similarity of two different stimulations, 
but rather identify two stimulations as the same stimulation, occurring twice. Quine cites the 
presence of the strong conditional in his definitio of stimulus meaning as the primary reason for 
this construal of stimulations: 
For, consider again the affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence S: the class Σ of 
all those stimulations that would prompt assent to S. If the stimulations were taken as 
events rather than event forms, then Σ would have to be a class of events which 
largely did not and will not happen, but which would prompt assent to S if they were 
to happen. Whenever Σ contained one realized or unrealized particular stimulatory 
event σ, it would have to contain all other unrealized duplicates of σ; and how many 
are there of these? Certainly it is hopeless nonsense to talk thus of unrealized 
particulars and try to assemble them into classes. Unrealized entities have to be 
construed as universals. (p. 34, italics in original) 
Thus, for considerations that are both ontological and pragmatic, Quine adopts an understanding 
of stimulations as universals. (See also Quine 1948.) 
 Finally, we return to the notion of holism, and see how it connects with this account of 
stimulus meaning. In Quine’s “Two Dogmas”, we saw his extreme holism, which located the 
empirical import of scientific claims in the entire corporate body of science. Here we see Quine 
explaining how he modified his view to a more moderat  holism. Quine points out that the notion 
of stimulus meaning for sentences offers us a way into a foreign theory (i.e., language, conceptual 
scheme), since the stimulus meaning provides us with a suitable behavioral criterion for 
establishing some semblance of empirical meaning. It gives us a wedge for entering a language 
without being familiar with the language as a whole. So even though for a great deal of a given 
language, the meanings of sentences are dependent on fur her sentences for their meaning, and so 





 Quine begins this section by explaining the distinction between occasion sentences and 
standing sentences. Occasion sentences are those that “command assent or dissent only if queried 
after an appropriate prompting stimulation” (p. 35-36). Standing sentences can be prompted by 
certain stimulations as well, but more importantly, they can occur independently of any current 
stimulation, completely unprompted. This distinction, in true Quinean fashion, is not a rigid or 
absolute one. Rather, it is relative to the modulus. “An occasion sentence modulo n seconds can 
be a standing sentence modulo n – 1” (p. 36). The stimulations that belong to neith r the 
affirmative nor negative stimulus meaning of an occasion sentence are those that would inhibit a 
response to the query. The same definition applies as well to stimulations that belong to neither 
the affirmative nor the negative stimulus meaning of a standing sentence, except that this class of 
stimulations would also include irrelevant stimulations, “which neither prompt nor inhibit” (p. 
36).  
 The stimulus meaning of an occasion sentence is define  as a “full cross-section of the 
subject’s evolving dispositions to assent to or dissent from a sentence” (p. 36). Standing 
sentences, since they are less affected by a given prompting stimulus, do not have their “intuitive 
meaning” reflected well in stimulus meaning. Thus, the rest of this section is primarily focused on 
occasion sentences alone.  
 Occasion sentences, though their stimulus meanings are a closer approximation to our 
intuitive concept of meaning, still fall short of establishing a synonymy relation. The problem is 
that the subject’s response can often “depend excessively on prior collateral information as a 
supplement to the present prompting stimulus” (p. 37)  The subject might have just witnessed 
something earlier that sways his verdict. For example, he may have recently heard another native 
utter ‘gavagai’ without having had the same stimulation that prompted the other native’s 
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utterance. Quine offers the example of the “rabbit-fly,” an hypothetical creature that is known for 
being in the presence of rabbits. The native may have not gotten a clear sight of an animal 
scurrying by, but he does clearly spot a rabbit-fly. Such a stimulation would belong to the 
affirmative stimulus meaning of ‘Gavagai’ for the native, but not that of ‘Rabbit’ for the linguist.  
 An ideal affirmative stimulus meaning for ‘Gavagai’ would include stimulations that 
would prompt assent based on an understanding of the word alone, and would not be affected by 
collateral information, unlike the above examples. But our problem is precisely that we have no 
way of drawing a strict distinction between collater l information and linguistic meaning:  
…we have made no general experimental sense of a distinct on between what goes 
into a native’s learning to apply an expression and what goes into his learning 
supplementary matters about the objects concerned… There is no evident criterion 
whereby to strip such effects away and leave just the meaning of ‘Gavagai’ properly 
so-called—whatever meaning properly so-called may be… What we objectively have 
is just an evolving set of dispositions to be prompted by stimulations to assent to or 
dissent from sentences. These dispositions may be conceded to be impure in the 
sense of including worldly knowledge, but they contai  it in a solution which there is 
no precipitating (p. 38-39).  
Thus, Quine appeals to essentially the same general s ntiment that motivated his arguments 
against the analytic-synthetic distinction. There is no behavioral criterion for distinguishing 
between facts purely about language and empirical facts. The only prospects for such a criterion 
appeal to mentalistic notions, and therefore cannot be relevant to an account of language, which is 
an essentially public phenomenon.  
 The considerations in the section serve Quine’s purpose of demonstrating that stimulus 
meaning is not equivalent to the ordinary, intuitive notion of meaning. Nevertheless, stimulus 
meaning is all that our field linguist has to go on when he engages in radical translation. Quine 
also clarifies that the linguist in this case is translating “not by identity of stimulus meanings, but




 The stimulus meanings of words are subject to variation due to collateral information, 
some stimulus meanings varying more than others. Quine compares ‘Red’ with ‘Rabbit’, noting 
that ‘Red’ will show extremely little variation, resulting in a stimulus meaning that is quite 
similar to an ordinary understanding of the meaning of ‘Red’. ‘Rabbit’, as the examples 
throughout this chapter suggest, will tend to be subject to a great deal of variation due to intrusive 
information. ‘Bachelor’ will show even more such variation:  
An informant's assent to it is prompted genuinely enough by the sight of a face, yet it 
draws mainly on stored information and none on the prompting stimulation except as 
needed for recognizing the bachelor friend concerned. As one says in the uncritical 
jargon of meaning, the trouble with `Bachelor' is that its meaning transcends the 
looks of the prompting faces and concerns matters that can be known only through 
other channels. (p. 42) 
Thus the stimulus meaning of ‘Bachelor’ will be even more unlike its intuitive meaning than the 
stimulus meaning of ‘Rabbit’. While every English speaker knows the meaning of ‘Bachelor’ 
well enough, only those who share certain acquaintances will also have similar stimulus meanings 
for it.  
 So we find that stimulus meaning will tend to resemble intuitive accounts of meaning as 
the sentences in question are less subject to variation due to collateral information (such as with 
‘Red’). Quine thus arrives at his definition of an observation sentence:  
Occasion sentences whose stimulus meanings vary none under the influence of 
collateral information may naturally be called observations sentences, and their 
stimulus meanings may without fear of contradiction be said to do full justice to their 
meanings. (p. 42) 
Given Quine’s tendency to deny absolute distinctions throughout much of his work, one might be 
puzzled by this definition, seemingly drawing a line between sentences whose stimulus meanings 
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vary due to collateral information, and those that do not. However, Quine is quick to improve this 
language to something more behaviorally appropriate:  
…we may speak of degrees of observationality… What we have is a gradation of 
observationality from one extreme, at ‘Red’ or above, to the other extreme at 
‘Bachelor’ or below… For, in behavioral terms, an occasion sentence may be said to 
be the more observational the more nearly its stimulus meanings for different 
speakers tend to coincide. Granted, this definition fails to give demerit marks for the 
effects of generally shared information, such as that about the rabbit-fly. But, as 
argued in § 9, I suspect that no systematic experimental sense is to be made of a 
distinction between usage due to meaning and usage due to generally shared 
collateral information. (p. 42-43) 
All that is necessary for being an observation sentence, then, is simply for that occasion sentence 
to be on the higher end of the scale of observationlity.  
 Quine’s definition of observationality implies tha it is a social concept. It requires a 
community of speakers so that we can compare stimulus meanings. Stimulus meaning itself, 
however, requires only one speaker, and the next section investigates this notion.  
§11 
 Quine begins this section by noting a curious asymmetry between the stimulus meanings 
of ‘Bachelor’ and ‘Unmarried man’ when considered as either between two speakers or within 
only one speaker. In the former case, the stimulus meanings of the two sentences are not 
identical. In the latter case, however, we find that e stimulus meanings are identical. For a 
single individual, the stimulus meanings of ‘Bachelor’ and ‘Unmarried man’ are the same; the 
stimulations that would prompt assent or dissent for he one would do the same for the other. 
Thus we find that “stimulus synonymy, or sameness of stimulus meaning,” works equally well for 
non-observational occasion sentences (such as ‘Bachelor’) as it does for highly observational 
occasion sentences (such as ‘Red’) if we restrict ourselves to considering one speaker (p. 46). 
‘Bachelor’ and ‘Unmarried man’ are stimulus synonymous for one speaker, but Quine rejects that 
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the two sentences are synonymous on an intuitive account of meaning (or, rather, he rejects that 
there is any sense to such a claim). “Very well; here is a case where we may welcome the 
synonymy and let the meaning go” (p. 46).  
 Additionally, we can say, in a sense, that ‘Bachelor’ and ‘Unmarried man’ are stimulus-
synonymous for the whole community, since it is true for each and every speaker within it. The 
same could also be true of a bilingual speaker when we expand the hypothetical to include two 
communities speaking two different languages. (Quine ses a Spanish example: ‘Soltero’ as 
stimulus-synonymous with ‘Bachelor’.) This would of course need to be checked by confirming 
that the bilingual speaker’s communication between th  two communities is fluent and 
comparable to that of other bilinguals.  
 Quine then reminds us that even this kind of intrasubjective stimulus synonymy is not 
immune to the intrusion of collateral information:  
…consider the Himalayan explorer who has learned to apply `Everest' to a distant 
mountain seen from Tibet and `Gaurisanker' to one seen from Nepal. As occasion 
sentences these words have mutually exclusive stimulus meanings for him until his 
explorations reveal, to the surprise of all concerned, that the peaks are identical. His 
discovery is painfully empirical, not lexicographic; nevertheless the stimulus 
meanings of `Everest' and `Gaurisanker' coincide for him thenceforward. (p. 49) 
In an endnote, Quine admits that this example is not technically geographically accurate, but this 
is beside the point, since our entire discussion of radical translation is speculative anyway. 
Quine’s point is to highlight the idea that “two terms can in fact be coextensive, or true of the 
same things, without being intrasubjectively stimulus-synonymous as occasion sentences” (p. 51). 
Intrasubjective stimulus synonymy, it seems, will not improve the situation of the field linguist 






 In this section, Quine presents in more detail his infamous ‘gavagai’ example. As Quine 
would later note, it is precisely this example that received more attention than it should have, and 
it had the effect of contributing to a fairly common misreading of Quine’s intentions in this 
section, and consequently in this chapter as a whole. In “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of 
Translation”, Quine says:  
My gavagai example has figured too centrally in discussions of the indeterminacy of 
translation. Readers see the example as the ground f the doctrine, and hope by 
resolving the example to case doubt on the doctrine. Th  real ground of the doctrine 
is very different, broader, and deeper. (Quine 1970a, p. 178, italics in original) 
It will be helpful, then, to keep this point in mind as we examine the ‘gavagai’ example, and try to 
sort out exactly what it is that Quine was actually up to in this section.  
 The central point of this chapter is rather explicitly stated in the first paragraph of this 
section: “Stimulus synonymy of the occasion sentence ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Rabbit’ does not even 
guarantee that ‘gavagai’ and ‘rabbit’ are coextensive terms, terms true of the same things” (p. 51). 
There are two things to take notice of in this statement. The first is that Quine has begun this 
section with an inversion of the point he used as the conclusion of the previous section. At the 
end of §11, Quine said that coextensiveness is not ufficient for stimulus-synonymy. In the 
beginning of §12, Quine says that stimulus-synonymy is not sufficient for coextensiveness. The 
second is that Quine is using capitalization as a way of distinguishing between words and 
sentences. Failure to keep track of this distinctio can lead to a serious misreading of Quine’s 
arguments in this book.  
Quine would later adopt a distinct terminology for the indeterminacy of reference of 
terms, which is the subject of §12, as opposed to the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. 
Quine employed many different terms to describe the ind terminacy of reference, including 
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ontological relativity and inscrutability of reference (Quine 1969a). We can treat all three 
expressions as naming the same thesis (and Quine seems to have thought so as well [Quine 1986, 
p. 459]). But for the sake of clarity as well as efficiency, we will reserve the term ‘indeterminacy’ 
for referring to the indeterminacy of translation of sentences, and the term ‘inscrutability’ 
exclusively for the indeterminacy of reference.  
 Quine begins this section by stressing that stimulus synonymy of the sentences ‘Gavagai’ 
and ‘Rabbit’ is not sufficient for establishing the coextensiveness of the t rms ‘gavagai’ and 
‘rabbit’. (Throughout much of this section, Quine sometimes uses the misleading phrase 
“synonymy of terms”. This is strange, since Quine has earlier stressed that terms only have 
meaning by virtue of their use in sentences. We shall instead speak of coextension to ward off any 
potential confusion.) So even if we assume that we have established the sameness of stimulus 
meanings of ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Rabbit’, we still have not established that the term ‘gavagai’ refers to 
a “whole enduring rabbit”, as the field linguist would be naturally inclined to suspect. The term 
‘gavagai’ could just as easily refer to rabbit-stages, temporal segments of a rabbit, undetached 
rabbit parts, the “single though discontinuous potion of the spatiotemporal world that consists of 
rabbits”, or the recurring universal of “rabbithood” (p. 52). Quine considers the natural objection 
that all we need to settle this “imagined indecision” (p. 52) is just a little more precision in our 
pointing and indicating along with the prompting stimulation. But Quine argues that this cannot 
solve the problem:  
Point to a rabbit and you have pointed to a stage of a rabbit, to an integral part of a 
rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and to where rabbithood is manifested. Point to an integral 
part of a rabbit and you have pointed again to the remaining four sorts of things; and 
so on around. Nothing not distinguished in stimulus meaning itself is to be 
distinguished by pointing, unless the pointing is accompanied by questions of identity 
and diversity: `Is this the same gavagai as that?', `Do we have here one gavagai or 
two?'. Such questioning requires of the linguist a command of the native language far 
beyond anything that we have as yet seen how to account for.” (p. 52-53) 
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The reason that we cannot assume the construal of reference of the term ‘gavagai’ that is most 
natural to us is that how we conceive of rabbits is a peculiar feature of our own conceptual and 
referential apparatus: 
…our own various auxiliaries to objective reference: our articles and pronouns, our 
singular and plural, our copula, our identity predicate. The whole apparatus is 
interdependent, and the very notion of term is as provincial to our culture as are those 
associated devices. The native may achieve the samenet ffects through linguistic 
structures so different that any eventual construing of our devices in the native 
language and vice versa can prove unnatural and largely arbitrary. (Cf. § 15.) Yet the 
net effects, the occasion sentences and not the terms, can match up in point of 
stimulus meanings as well as ever for all that. Occasion sentences and stimulus 
meaning are general coin; terms and reference are local to our conceptual scheme.” 
(p. 53) 
The native can conceive of objects in the world in a completely strange and radically different 
way. The native can employ a referential apparatus that is incapable of direct translation into our 
own language term for term, phrase for phrase, without significant interpretational decisions on 
the part of the linguist. These interpretational decisions would necessarily impose some kind of 
conceptual scheme onto the native, thereby going far beyond any evidence present in stimulus 
meaning.  
 At this point it may be useful to recall Quine’s ue of the term ‘ontological relativity’ to 
describe this situation. Although the native’s conceptual scheme may be radically different from 
our own, and we can still manage to come up with acceptable translations of sentences of the 
native’s language into sentences of English that would not hinder communication. We could also 
speak in an intuitive, uncritical way and say that t ese translations would retain the meaning of 
the original sentences, despite varying referents of the component terms. The idea is that our 
translation manual would systematically offset any referential incompatibilities of particular pairs 
of sentences by making changes elsewhere in the manual:   
We could equate a native expression with any of the disparate English terms `rabbit', 
`rabbit stage', `undetached rabbit part', etc., and still, by compensatorily juggling the 
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translation of numerical identity and associated particles, preserve conformity to 
stimulus meanings of occasion sentences. (p. 54) 
 The reason that we see the same general kind of ineterminacy affecting the translation of 
sentences as well as terms is that when “other languages than our own are involved, 
coextensiveness of terms is not a manifestly clearer notion than synonymy or translation itself” 
(p. 54). When restricted to our own language, coextension has a relatively simple definition, 
though we shall not be concerned with the details of it here.  
 A final important part of this section is Quine’s introduction of his definition of stimulus-
analyticity: “I call a sentence stimulus-analytic for a subject if he would assent to it, or nothing, 
after every stimulation (within the modulus)” (p. 55). Quine notes that this definition has an 
analogous definition for terms rather than sentences. This requires a prior translation of logical 
particles such as ‘all’, ‘are’, and ‘=’, which is the subject of the next section.  
§13 
 Quine offers three “semantic criteria” (p. 57) forthe translation of truth functions from 
the native language. The addition of the term for negation will change a short sentence to which 
the native would assent into one from which the native would dissent. The conjunction function 
creates a compound that prompts assent always and only when each individual component also 
prompts assent. The alternation function creates a compound that prompts dissent only when each 
individual component also prompts dissent. Quine then notes:  
When we find that a native construction fulfills one or another of these three 
semantic criteria, we can ask no more toward an understanding of it. Incidentally we 
can then translate the idiom into English as ‘not’, ‘and’, or ‘or’ as the case may be, 
but only subject to sundry humdrum provisos; for it is well known that these three 
English words do not represent negation, conjunctio, and alternation exactly and 
unambiguously. (p. 58) 
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So by translating truth functions, we are not necessarily finding native equivalents of the English 
words ‘not’, ‘and’, or ‘or’. Further truth functions can also be constructed using the same basic 
method for negation, conjunction, and alternation.  
 Quine takes a brief digression into the problems of this approach when applied to an 
hypothetical culture with a “prelogical mentality” (p. 58). If we suppose that the natives accept 
sentences of the form ‘p and not p’ as true, then how can we go about translating such entences? 
Quine seems to take the view that we should, in our translations, impose our own logic upon their 
utterances. As a general maxim of good translation, we should interpret patently absurd sentences 
as being due to some unknown difference between languages, rather than a fundamental logical 
failure.  
 Returning to our original case, let us suppose that we have completely translated the 
native’s logical laws as far as truth functions are concerned. The natural next step in translating 
logic, Quine suggests, is to move on to the categoricals (i.e., All x are y; No x are y; Some x are 
y; Some x are not y). The problem with translating hese kinds of statements, however, is the 
same as what we saw in the previous section with the ‘gavagai’ example: 
The difficulty is fundamental. The categoricals depend for their truth on the objects, 
however external and however inferential, of which the component terms are true; 
and what those objects are is not uniquely determined by stimulus meanings. Indeed 
the categoricals, like plural endings and identity, are part of our own special 
apparatus of objective reference, whereas stimulus meaning is, to repeat § 12, 
common coin. Of what we think of as logic, the truth-functional part is the only part 
the recognition of which, in a foreign language, we se m to be able to pin down to 
behavioral criteria. (p. 61) 
§14 
 In this section, Quine revisits the intuitive notions of synonymy and analyticity, picking 
up where he left off after “Two Dogmas” and applying the lessons learned from the discussion of 
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the scenario of radical translation. Synonymy should be distinguished between a broad and a 
narrow type. Synonymy in the narrow sense is  
…what Carnap calls intensional isomorphism, involving certain part-by-part 
correspondences of the sentences concerned… But such variant versions can be 
defined on the basis of the broader one. Synonymy of parts is defined by appeal to 
analogy of roles in synonymous wholes; then synonymy in the narrower sense is 
defined for the wholes by appeal to synonymy of homol gous parts. (p. 62). 
Thus we can simply focus on the broad sense, and leve the narrow sense behind. 
The broad sense, Quine says, is such that “two sentences command assent concomitantly 
and dissent concomitantly, and this concomitance is due strictly to word usage rather than how 
things happen in the world” (p. 62). Quine acknowledg s that the standard expression of this type 
of synonymy would refer to truth values rather than assent and dissent, but if we are to make 
sense of the notion in terms of verbal behavior, then this formulation should be preferred.  
When considering occasion sentences, stimulus synonymy does fairly well in realizing 
synonymy in the broad sense, as we saw above in §9 through §11. The same is true of standings 
sentences when the variability of assent and dissent i  not significantly different from that of 
occasion sentences. As this variability decreases, however, so does the resemblance of stimulus 
synonymy to synonymy in the broad sense. We can adjust the modulus of the stimulations in an 
attempt to “tighten the relation of stimulus synonymy”, but lengthening the modulus to very long 
periods can adversely affect the usefulness of the stimulus meanings in question (p. 63). 
“Lengthening the modulus enriches stimulus meanings and tightens stimulus synonymy only as it 
diminishes scrutability of stimulus synonyms.” (p. 63). A very long modulus will leave open the 
possibility that new intrusions of collateral information could occur, or changes in the meaning of 
the subject’s language (if we may speak uncritically). Thus, stimulations that are likely to give us 
at least some clue toward stimulus synonymy will generally need to have a modulus that is longer 
than an instantaneous moment, and shorter than, say, a month.  
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Holism again rears its head, which should be no surprise in a section titled ‘Synonymous 
and Analytic Sentences’. A major component of Quine’s argument against the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in his ‘Two Dogmas’ was that theory construction (in the broadest possible sense) 
proceeds holistically. As we’ve noted above, Quine advanced an “extreme holism” in that classic 
essay, but weakens that view to a more “moderate holism” in Word & Object:  
The trouble lies in the interconnections of sentences. If the business of a sentence can 
be exhausted by an account of the experiences that would confirm or disconfirm it as 
an isolated sentence in its own right, then the sentence is substantially an occasion 
sentence. The significant trait of other sentences is that experience is relevant to them 
largely in indirect ways, through the mediation of associated sentences. Alternatives 
emerge: experiences call for changing a theory, but do not indicate just where and 
how. Any of various systematic changes can accommodate the recalcitrant datum, 
and all the sentences affected by any of those possible alternative readjustments 
would evidently have to count as disconfirmed by that datum indiscriminately or not 
at all. Yet the sentences can be quite unlike with respect to content, intuitively 
speaking, or role in the containing theory. (p. 64) 
Quine then digresses into a brief response to part of n essay by H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, 
“In Defense of a Dogma” (1956), which itself was a response to Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas’. The 
details of Quine’s remarks here are not important for our purposes. However, it is intersting that 
in Grice and Strawson’s essay, part of their argument appears to be that it is a reductio ad 
absurdum of Quine’s view on meaning if it implies that talk of “correct or incorrect ranslation” 
is meaningless (Grice and Strawson 1956, p. 146). In hindsight, this is rather humorous. It is as if 
Quine read this response, completely agreed with this implication, and then drafted his thought 
experiment of radical translation to show that it isn’t really the problem that Grice and Strawson 
thought it was.  
 Having compared intuitive synonymy with stimulus synonymy, Quine then does the same 
with analyticity, which is commonly regarded as interdefinable with synonymy (or, at least, it 
was around the time of Word & Object). Quine identifies analyticity as an intuitive conept, 
which states that an analytic sentence is “true purly by meaning and independently of collateral 
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information” (p. 65). Quine points out that philosophical tradition has sometimes regarded 
analytic truths as coextensive with a priori and necessary truths. Quine is not concerned with 
whether this is true. Instead, he comments that none of these three categories of truths have been 
defined in terms of observable behavior. Quine speculates on what such a definition of analyticity 
may look like: “the analytic sentences are those that we are prepared to affirm come what may” 
(p. 66). But this definition needs some cleaning up, Quines argues, with respect to ‘what may’. It 
may be objected that we would give up the analyticit  of ‘No bachelor is married’ if we found a 
married bachelor. Quine sees no way of answering the objection without at least implicitly 
relying on analyticity itself. So Quine suggests modifying ‘come what may’ as ‘come what 
stimulation may’, which is “virtually the definition (§12) of stimulus analyticity” (p. 66).  
 We saw with stimulus synonymy that we could socialize it, and thereby improve its 
scope. Quine suggests that we can do the same for stimulus-analyticity, taking sentences as 
socially stimulus-analytic if they are “stimulus-analytic for almost everybody” (p. 66). But this 
definition would apply equally to sentences such as ‘There have been black dogs’ or ‘2+2=4’. So 
we find, unsurprisingly, that social stimulus analyticity does not approximate its traditional 
intuitive counterpart any better than stimulus synonymy did. Quine recognizes them as “not 
behavioristic reconstructions of intuitive semantics, but only a behavioristic ersatz” (p. 66). 
 Quine ends this section with some speculation on the intuitions that enforce our sense of 
the traditional picture of analyticity and synonymy. The details here are not important for our 
purposes, but there is one important statement that helps to clarify Quine’s position on 
analyticity: “The intuitions are blameless in their way, but it would be a mistake to look to them 
for a sweeping epistemological dichotomy between analytic truths as by-products of language and 
synthetic truths as reports on the world” (p. 67). This quotation is important because Quine is 
trying to clarify his arguments in ‘Two Dogmas’. After reading ‘Two Dogmas’, it is easy to come 
away with the sense that Quine was arguing that there is no possible way to draw a distinction 
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between analytic and synthetic sentences. But this is not what Quine had intended to say. His 
point was rather that there is no way of drawing that distinction that would be able to do the kind 
of epistemological work that the logical positivists had wanted it to do (Hylton 2007, p. 68-74).        
§15 
 Quine begins this section with a summary of the possible kinds of results that our field 
linguist can achieve, given his methodological situat on:  
(1) Observation sentences can be translated. There is uncertainty, but the situation is 
the normal inductive one. (2) Truth functions can be translated. (3) Stimulus-analytic 
sentences can be recognized. So can the sentences of th  opposite type, the "stimulus-
contradictory" sentences, which command irreversible dissent. (4) Questions of 
intrasubjective stimulus synonymy of native occasion sentences even of non-
observational kind can be settled if raised, but the sentences cannot be translated.”  
(p. 68) 
These are quite obviously very limited results. Thelinguist cannot do much toward gaining an 
understanding of the native language based on theseools alone. So how does the linguist 
progress from here? He constructs analytical hypotheses: “He segments heard utterances into 
conveniently short recurrent parts, and thus compiles a list of native "words." Various of these he 
hypothetically equates to English words and phrases, in such a way as to conform to (l)-(4). Such 
are his analytical hypotheses” (p. 68). Although the concept of analytical hypotheses is only being 
introduced now at the tail end of the chapter on radical translation, it should not be thought that 
analytical hypotheses can only be constructed afterthe work in (1)-(4) has been completed. 
Indeed, Quine points out that (4), intrasubjective stimulus synonymy, will be practically fruitless 
if not guided by tentative analytical hypotheses.  
Quine notes that our field linguist need not be absolutely strict in making sure his 
analytical hypotheses conform universally to (1)-(4): “the neater the analytical hypotheses, the 
more tolerance” (p. 69). For example, if a native socially stimulus-analytic sentence is translated 
as ‘All rabbits are men reincarnate’, the translator must have had considerable reason for this. If 
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no stimulations would prompt the natives to dissent from this sentence, then our linguist would 
have had to make significant adjustments elsewhere among his analytical hypotheses to allow for 
an English translation that is also socially stimulus-analytic. Considerations of simplicity (and 
reliance on Quine’s holism), then, allow for tolerance in this kind of situation. In the average 
case, however, Quine argues that “the more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the 
more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations; the myth of the prelogical people marks 
only the extreme. For translation theory, banal messages are the breath of life” (p. 69).  
 Analytical hypotheses, as defined above, should not be seen as forming a list of 
translations, word for word, phrase for phrase. There may be cases where a native word may be 
translated as an English phrase, or a native phrase as an English word, depending on the context. 
An implication of this, however, is that we will now need additional instructions to explain these 
kinds of choices of translation.  
Since there is no general positional correspondence between the words and phrases of 
one language and their translations in another, some analytical hypotheses will be 
needed also to explain syntactical constructions. These are usually described with 
help of auxiliary terms for various classes of native words and phrases. Taken 
together, the analytical hypotheses and auxiliary definitions constitute the linguist's 
jungle-to-English dictionary and grammar. The form they are given is immaterial 
because their purpose is not translation of words o constructions but translation of 
coherent discourse; single words and constructions come up for attention only as 
means to that end. (p. 70) 
In addition to the considerations above, another reason why these auxiliaries are necessary is 
because throughout the process of radical translation, Quine has made “no essential use of a 
distinction between word and phrase” (p. 62). This is partly because Quine is suspicious of 
finding an acceptable criterion of identity for a word (p. 13-14), which is in line with Quine’s 
well-known dictum: “No entity without identity” (Quine 1958, p. 20; or Quine 1969, p. 23). 
Furthermore, the methods available to the field lingu st in his elicitations of the native provide 
relatively meager results: “stimulus meanings never suffice to determine even what words are 
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terms, if any, much less what terms are coextensive” (p. 70). Thus, our field linguist must go 
beyond the immediate behavioral evidence and construct analytical hypotheses so that he can 
construct a fuller and more coherent account of the native’s language: 
The method of analytical hypotheses is a way of catapul ing oneself into the jungle 
language by the momentum of the home language. It is a way of grafting exotic 
shoots on to the old familiar bush-to recur to the concluding metaphor of § 2-until 
only the exotic meets the eye. From the point of view of a theory of translational 
meaning the most notable thing about the analytical hypotheses is that they exceed 
anything implicit in any native's dispositions to speech behavior. By bringing out 
analogies between sentences that have yielded to translation and others they extend 
the working limits of translation beyond where independent evidence can exist.” (p. 
70) 
Recall the three methods of learning sentences that Quine presented in §3. Here we see the field 
linguist transcending direct conditioning and employing analogical synthesis in order to construct 
analytical hypotheses. Once these have been thoroughly constructed, the linguist can presumably 
move on to the interanimation of sentences.  
 The possible yield of the linguist’s methods listed above in (1)-(4) does not exhaust all 
possible evidence. As Quine mentioned in §11, the linguist can take the time to become bilingual, 
and then resume the construction of a translation ma ual. In such a case, (1)-(4) above would be 
amended as follows: “(1') All occasion sentences can be translated. Point (4) drops as 
superfluous. But even our bilingual, when he brings off translations not allowed for under (1')-(3), 
must do so by essentially the method of analytical hypotheses, however unconscious” (p. 71). 
Thus, while the bilingual linguist may gain some ground with respect to non-observational 
occasion sentences, he is not significantly better off than our original field linguist.  
 Finally, we arrive at Quine’s formulation of the final product of our hypothetical field 
linguist’s labors—the translation manual:  
[T]he linguist's finished jungle-to-English manual has as its net yield an infinite 
semantic correlation of sentences: the implicit specification of an English sentence, 
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or various roughly interchangeable English sentences, for every one of the infinitely 
many possible jungle sentences. Most of the semantic correlation is supported only 
by analytical hypotheses, in their extension beyond the zone where independent 
evidence for translation is possible. That those unverifiable translations proceed 
without mishap must not be taken as pragmatic evidence of good lexicography, for 
mishap is impossible. (p. 71, italics added) 
This final sentence is a crucial one, for this is the point that distinguishes the indeterminacy of 
translation as a distinct and separate idea from the under-determination of theory by evidence. In 
translation, there is no “fact of the matter”, as Quine would put it in later works (Quine 1979). 
While evidence for our scientific understanding of the physical world may not establish one 
unique theory that fits that evidence (as is implied by Quine’s holism), there is nonetheless a fact 
about how the physical world actually is. Only one “final” scientific account of the universe can 
actually be true to the facts. It just so happens that we are in an epistemological situation that 
prevents us from ever demonstrating that we have that account, even if we do. Translation, on the 
other hand, is not like this. The problem is not merely epistemological, it is ontological. If we 
assume that we have all of the physical facts about every feature of the universe, this would still 
not suffice to determine a uniquely correct translation of a native sentence into an English 
sentence (provided that the native sentence is not a highly observational occasion sentence). 
There will be multiple equally good translations of the native sentence, in that they equally match 
all of the behavioral and dispositional evidence. There will be at least two such translations, 
which Quine refers to here as “incompatible” (p. 72).  
Quine would later reformulate this way of explaining the two rival translation manuals in 
response to his misgivings, mentioned earlier, about the behavioral import of notions such as 
“equivalence”. In his reply to Gilbert Harman’s essay in Words and Objections (Quine 1969b), 
Quine accepts Harman’s suggested formulation, saying that for a given native sentence, two 
translators using two manuals that both match all dispositions to verbal behavior may disagree on 
how that sentence should be translated. This way the point is put in terms of dispositions to 
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behavior, rather than relying on the notion that the two manuals are somehow inherently 
incompatible, which seems to be just an inversion of the equivalence notion that Quine was 
uncomfortable with in his original formulation. In Pursuit of Truth (Quine 1992), Quine explains 
this incompatibility as saying that if we translated a paragraph of native sentences into English 
using two rival translation manuals, alternating between manuals with each sentence, the resulting 
translation would be incoherent. 
Quine closes this section with a point that has gone unnoticed or uncomprehended by 
many commentators on the indeterminacy thesis: “…one has only to reflect on the nature of 
possible data and methods to appreciate the indeterminacy” (p. 72). As I emphasized in the 
previous chapter, all of the real work in Quine’s argument for the indeterminacy thesis was over 
with before he even presents the radical translation scenario. That thought experiment is but an 
illustration. The real argument begins with Quine’s commitment to science, as I stressed at the 
beginning of the present chapter. Empiricism and naturalism are themselves findings of science. 
Empiricism implies linguistic behaviorism, and natur lism implies holism. Together, behaviorism 
and holism imply the indeterminacy of translation. 
§16 
 The final section of this chapter is spent guarding against anticipated objections to the 
indeterminacy thesis. We will not be concerned with any of these specific objections. Instead, in 
the next chapter, we will examine and evaluate other objections that appeared after the 







ASSESSING COMMON CRITICISMS 
Now that we have established a basis for interpreting Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, we can begin 
to assess criticisms. We shall begin by analyzing some common objections and attempting to 
employ our interpretation of indeterminacy in the resolution of these problems. Then, we shall 
examine two cases where confusions surrounding the und r-determination of theory by data have 
affected arguments against indeterminacy. Finally, we will turn to an argument by John Searle, 
which attempts to defend our intuitive conceptions about meaning and reference from Quine’s 
pernicious indeterminacy.  
Four Widespread Criticisms 
Roger Gibson provides an account of “some of the more widespread criticisms” (Gibson 
1998, p. 28) of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. Gibson lists four such criticisms as follows:  
(a) The indeterminacy thesis is not proven deductively. 
(b) Linguistics is under-determined, but not indeterminate.  
(c) The indeterminacy thesis is unintelligible or self-r uting. 
(d) Actual translation has more evidence to go on than radical translation.  
Let us see how our reading of Word & Object helps us to explain why these objections rest on 




The indeterminacy thesis is not proven deductively. 
This particular objection may very well be conceded to be true, but it doesn’t affect 
Quine’s argument. The thought experiment of radical translation was never intended to serve as a 
deductive proof of indeterminacy. It is, after all, only a thought experiment. In the beginning of 
Chapter 2 of Word & Object, Quine says that he will “try to make the point plausible” (p. 27), 
which would be quite a strange choice of words for someone attempting to provide a deductive 
proof. In his later writings, Quine began referring to his indeterminacy thesis as a “conjecture” 
(Quine 2000, p. 419). He even explicitly contrasts indeterminacy of translation with inscrutability 
of reference, which he says can be so easily proven as to be trivial (Quine 1992, p. 50). So 
Quine’s arguments for the indeterminacy of translation should not be read as if they were 
providing an absolute proof the thesis.  
Linguistics is under-determined, but not indeterminate. 
Some critics grant that science is under-determined by all possible evidence, and since 
linguistics is a part of our overall scientific theory, then it too shares in under-determination. But 
these critics are not willing to grant that there is some kind of unique indeterminacy that goes 
beyond the usual under-determination. Now, notice that these critics have at least avoided the 
mistake of confusing under-determination with indeterminacy. But they have failed to grasp the 
background argument for indeterminacy, which has been detailed over the past two chapters. As 
mentioned before, it all starts with taking science seriously.  
It is a finding of science, according to Quine, that empiricism is true. Human beings only 
have five sensory modalities which serve as the ultimate source of all of our knowledge of the 
world. Thus all that we know has been observed or inferred based on what has been observed. 
Applying this point to language, we naturally come to the conclusion of linguistic behaviorism: 
all facts about language must be learned through observable behavior. Additionally, throughout 
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his various writings, including the first chapter of Word & Object, Quine has advocated his own 
understanding of naturalism, which Quine also views as a finding of science (Hylton 2014, p. 
150ff). Naturalism, again, is in part the idea that empirical science is the best path to knowledge 
thus far devised. There is no a priori standpoint that the philosopher occupies from which she can 
evaluate, free from any theoretical biases or previously adopted conceptual schemes, our system 
of knowledge. There is no sense to or hope for the Cartesian quest for a certain foundation for 
human knowledge. Thus naturalism naturally leads us to accept holism: the idea that our 
knowledge is a unified “web” of interdependent beliefs. Certain beliefs are on the edges of the 
web and can be directly tested in experience (such as t ose represented in observation sentences), 
while others are more central (such as beliefs about logic, mathematics, or highly theoretical 
physics) and can only be tested via indirect connections to the beliefs on the edge of the web. 
When we combine behaviorism and holism, the natural implication is the indeterminacy of 
translation. Behaviorism, again, implies that all our linguistic knowledge depends on observable 
events. Holism implies that there are multiple ways of constructing our “web” of knowledge that 
are equally consistent with our observations. Thus, for linguistic meaning that is far removed 
from experience, there simply is no fact of the matter that determines it. This is an ontological 
point. There is no physical (i.e., behavioral) state of affairs that could possibly ground the 
meaning of such statements. This is in contrast to physical theory, which is under-determined, but 
nonetheless there is some physical state of affairs which determines the facts of physics. Under-
determination of physical theory is epistemological. Indeterminacy of translation is ontological. 
The indeterminacy thesis is unintelligible or self-r futing. 
This objection attempts to identify a contradiction n Quine’s own presentation of the 
indeterminacy of translation. As we just saw in the pr vious response, the point that Quine wishes 
to make with the indeterminacy thesis is ontological. There are no such entities as meanings (or 
propositions, etc.). What sense can there be, then,o saying that we can create two translation 
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manuals of the native’s language that assign different, incompatible meanings to the respective 
translations of a certain native sentence? What does it mean to say that the translations are unlike 
in meaning if, as Quine argues, there is no such thing as sameness of meaning?  
This is a serious objection, and it is one which Quine appears to have concerned himself 
with while he was writing Word & Object, as we saw earlier in our discussion of §7. As we not d 
there, Quine does eventually find, within Word & Object, a formulation for the indeterminacy 
thesis that doesn’t rely on appeals to the notion of meaning at all. Additionally, in one of the 
many later writings where Quine revisits the concept of indeterminacy, he finds another way of 
explicating the issue which appeals strictly to behavioral terms. In his 1992 book Pursuit of 
Truth, Quine says that indeterminacy can be understood as implying the existence of two 
translation manuals, equally correct (i.e., the use of either manual results in fluent dialogue), 
cannot be used in alternation on a sentence-by-sentence basis without resulting in incoherent 
dialogue (i.e., verbal behavior that causes confused reactions in the native speakers).  
This objection, although relatively easy to avoid, does highlight a point that is worth 
discussing further. Quine, in many of his works, makes casual appeal to notions that he has made 
explicit arguments against, such as meaning, proposition , properties, attributes, or the 
propositional attitudes and other mentalistic discourse. It is important to recognize that in most 
cases Quine employs these concepts for a heuristic purpose, similar, perhaps, to Wittgenstein’s 
ladder. Quine uses problematic notions to highlight problems contained in them, and then we can 
cast them aside. In some cases, however, such as those involving reference to propositional 
attitudes, Quine even recognizes that such talk is absolutely indispensable, not only in our 
personal lives, but also in the social sciences (Quine 1992, p. 72-3). Quine will sometimes invoke 
the notion of meaning even within the same chapter that argues against it, but it should be 
understood that such references do not in themselves implicate Quine to an ontological 
commitment to the existence of meanings as entities. In fact, the most important point of Word & 
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Object is his proposed system of the regimentation of the language of science, in which we can 
rephrase sentences that casually appeal to problematic notions such that they are no longer 
implicit in our ontology. But that system is not our present concern.  
Actual translation has more evidence to go on than radical translation. 
This is another objection which may be conceded to be true, to a certain extent at least. 
When translating sentences of more familiar languages, such as French, German, or Chinese, 
there is another avenue of behavioral evidence available to the translator: the established tradition 
of translation made possible by a history of cultural interaction. Quine acknowledges this point, 
even adding that the “resemblance of cognate word forms” (p. 28) between languages within the 
same language family aids in determining translations. But this objection fails to recognize the 
scope of the indeterminacy of translation. As Gibson n tes, we could, in principle, devise an 
alternate system of analytical hypotheses for translation between French and English, for 
example, that would still be consistent with the behavioral evidence. In his later works, Quine 
even points out that indeterminacy infects one’s own native language: “For given the rival 
manuals of translation between Jungle and English, we can translate English perversely into 
English by translating it into Jungle by one manual and then back by the other” (Quine 1992, p. 
48). 
Confusions Due to Under-Determination 
As has been mentioned before, some readers have interpreted the indeterminacy of 
translation as just a special case of the under-determination of theory by data. Others have 
recognized that Quine intends to present indeterminacy as something additional to our ordinary 
notion of under-determination, but they cannot recognize in Quine’s writings any argument for 
this thesis that isn’t solely based on under-determination. There critics are then left wondering 
why Quine apparently thinks that because linguistics is under-determined, just like the rest of our 
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global scientific theory, then linguistics exhibits some additional kind of indeterminacy. If these 
critics are right, then it seems hard to disagree with them.  
Michael Dummett, for example, has advanced just such a view: “All I claim is that the 
under-determination of theory is the sole positive reason Quine has given for believing that 
indeterminacy of translation actually occurs, and that it is not in fact a cogent reason.” (Dummett 
1974, p. 416). Charles Chihara, likewise, has succumbed to this confusion, despite avoiding the 
tempting confusion of indeterminacy with inscrutability:  
Many philosophers have thought that Quine’s reasons for espousing the 
indeterminacy thesis are to be found in his discussion  of the ‘Gavagai’ example. But 
Quine tells us that the ‘real ground of the doctrine s very different, broader, and 
deeper’ [(Quine 1970a, p. 178)]. The real ground, evidently, is to be found in the fact 
(if it is a fact) that one can have two physical theories P and P* that are incompatible 
with each other and yet compatible with all possible data. (Chihara 1987, p. 44) 
Chihara goes on to search for additional considerations beyond a mere argument from under-
determination to indeterminacy, rightly recognizing that such an argument displays “an enormous 
gap in… reasoning” (Chihara, p. 45). He analyzes Quine’s remarks on the nature of evidence, 
which puts him in the right direction. However, he gets sidetracked with considerations on 
confirmation and falsification. These issues are too specific, however, for Quine’s background 
argument for indeterminacy, as we have seen, proceeds much more generally. It is Quine’s 
understanding of the nature of science as a whole and the scientific findings of naturalism and 
empiricism that bear the weight of Quine’s argument.  
 It is worth investigating, at this point, what accounts for this trend of confusion over 
Quine’s argument for indeterminacy. What led these philosophers to think that a philosopher as 
distinguished as Quine would commit himself to such an obviously weak argument? The answer, 
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surprisingly, appears to be Quine himself. Since misunderstandings of Quine’s arguments were 
quite common after the publication of Word & Object, Quine decided to revisit the issue of 
indeterminacy in an article titled “On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation” (Quine 
1970a). (We saw above that Chihara quoted this article in his essay.) In this essay, Quine 
considers the scope of under-determination of physical theory, and then applies this notion to the 
radical translation scenario. Just as it is within our own case, the native’s chosen physical theory 
is under-determined. This under-determination “recus in second intension” (Quine 1970a, p. 
179) when we are attempting to translate the native’s physical theory into our own language. All 
we have to go on are the translations of the native’s observation sentences, and then we must 
construct the remaining physical theory by projecting various analytical hypotheses. So the theory 
that the linguist is attempting to translate is under- etermined by the possible observations of the 
native, and then our translation itself is likewise under-determined by the possible observations of 
the native’s utterances. This compounded effect of under-determination, it seems, is somehow 
supposed to result in the indeterminacy of the translation of the native’s physical theory.  
 Unfortunately, Quine does not make his point much clearer in this essay. He does go out 
of his way a couple of times to emphasize the point that “the indeterminacy of translation is not 
just an instance of the empirically underdetermined character of physics”, that it is “additional” 
(Quine 1970a, p. 180). He goes on to say:  
Where physical theories A and B are both compatible with all possible data, we might 
adopt A for ourselves and still remain free to translate th  foreigner as believing A or 
as believing B… The question whether… the foreigner r ally believes A or believes 
rather B, is a question whose very significance I would putin doubt. This is what I 
am getting at in arguing the indeterminacy of transl tion. (Quine 1970a, p. 180-181) 
Despite Quine’s efforts, there still seems to be a gap in reasoning here. The gap is filled in, I 
suggest, by Quine’s naturalism, which is left unmentioned in this essay. The reason that we are 
able to definitively assign one theory to ourselves, but not to the native, is because we are always 
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operating from within one theory, one conceptual scheme, or another. When operating from 
within our own home language, we are taking seriously the conceptual scheme that comes along 
with it. This is how we can say that we know what we mean when we utter some sentence of our 
own theoretical physics. The same can be said of the native. But when it comes to bridging the 
gap between the two conceptual schemes, there is no basis for inter-theoretical meaning (beyond 
stimulus meaning, that is). Similar to how there is no sense in asking what entity in our 
contemporary physics is identical to, say, phlogiston or the ether, likewise there is no sense in 
asking if a certain sentence from our physical theory is identical in meaning to a sentence from 
the native’s physical theory. There just is no factof the matter, since the concepts originate from 
wholly alien conceptual schemes.  
 The proposed argument from under-determination to i determinacy thus seems 
insufficient without supplementary considerations from portions of what I have referred to as 
Quine’s background argument. Thus it seems more effective to simply proceed from that 
argument to begin with, and cast aside the under-det rmination argument. It only invites more 
confusion than it is worth. In any case, as Peter Hylton has pointed out, the argument from under-
determination seems to have fallen into disfavor for Quine in his later writings, so it would be 
best not to regard this as his primary argument for indeterminacy (Hylton, 2007, p. 218). 
Searle and “Common Sense” Confusions 
Finally, we turn to John Searle’s criticisms of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis as they are 
presented in his 1987 paper “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person”. Searle was 
educated at Oxford, and it is no mere coincidence that his work often bears a strong resemblance 
to that of the so-called “ordinary language” philosophers. Searle’s work, in many cases, supports 
positions that he takes to exemplify “common sense” or intuitively obvious views. Searle’s 
criticism of indeterminacy is just such a case. First, we shall identify some basic 
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misinterpretations by Searle. Then we will lay out Searle’s main arguments, and show how it fails 
to refute Quine’s position.  
Searle makes a few errors in his essay that are relatively independent of his main 
argument, but are worth correcting nonetheless. Firt, Searle incorrectly equates Quine’s 
“linguistic behaviorism” with the psychological behaviorism of B.F. Skinner. Thus, Searle 
believes that Quine’s entire thesis was refuted the year before Word & Object was even 
published, in Chomsky’s well-known review of Verbal Behavior (Skinner 1957). As we saw in 
our discussion of §2, however, Quine’s behaviorism should not be identified with that of Skinner. 
Quine’s behaviorism is purely linguistic, and does not necessarily have any implications for 
psychology. Curiously, Searle even acknowledges Quine’s clarification that his brand of 
behaviorism does not necessarily repudiate all forms of mental entities, and that it is only 
intended to apply to accounts of linguistic meaning a d language learning. Yet he still does not 
recognize the difference between Quine and Skinner. But all of this is really beside the point 
anyway, since Searle will ultimately argue that Quine’s behaviorism is a reductio ad absurdum of 
itself, and we need not depend on Chomsky.  
Searle also appears to exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of the indeterminacy 
thesis itself. He formulates the thesis as saying that “where questions of translation and, therefore, 
of meaning are concerned, there is no such thing as getting it right or wrong… because there is no 
fact of the matter to be right or wrong about” (Searl  1987, p. 127). This is a clear 
misrepresentation of the indeterminacy thesis. What indeterminacy implies is not that there is “no 
such thing as getting it right or wrong” when it comes to translation. Rather, indeterminacy of 
translation implies that there is at least more than one way of correctly translating a language. 
Indeterminacy only denies that there is a uniquely correct ranslation. There are in fact many 
ways of getting translation either right or wrong. Searle’s remarks here seems to suggest that 
indeterminacy implies that translation is impossible. But this is far from the case.  
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Additionally, Searle appears to conceive of the inscrutability of reference and ontological 
relativity as two distinct theses. In fact, he thinks that ontological relativity is best seen as “an 
unsuccessful maneuver to rescue [Quine’s] theory frm the apparently absurd consequences of 
[indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of re erence]” (Searle 1987, p. 127). However, the 
idea that inscrutability and ontological relativity are two distinct theses is one that Quine has 
disputed (Quine 1986, p. 459). Additionally, Searle has identified the inscrutability of reference 
as the “crux of the indeterminacy argument” (Searle 1987, p. 132). But this is mistaken. Quine 
argues that it is the indeterminacy of translation hat is the “serious and controversial thesis” 
(Quine 1992, p. 50). Additionally, as we saw in ourresponse to the first objection of this chapter, 
Quine thought of inscrutability of reference as trivial, and capable of easy proof. The simplest 
such proof is Quine’s example of proxy functions which invoke what he calls “cosmic 
complements” (Quine 1995, p. 71-73). These proxy functions are one-to-one mappings which 
reinterpret all references to physical objects as references to cosmic complements of those 
physical objects (i.e., everything in the universe that is not the object originally referred to). 
Quine notes that verbal behavior and even truth functio s would all be preserved under this 
reinterpretation. Even though Quine finds this idea trivial, Searle seems to find it quite 
threatening to our understanding of language.  
Now, we can proceed to Searle’s main argument. The basic line of his argument is that by 
simply entertaining Quine’s assumptions and following through with logical implications of the 
radical translation thought experiment, we find that t e consequences are so absurd that Quine’s 
entire position must be rejected. Searle argues that it is in fact Quine’s behavioristic assumption 
that is solely responsible for indeterminacy and inscrutability, and hence also for the absurd 
consequences of these doctrines. On this point, my account would grant that he is partially right. 
Behaviorism arguably may be the most important of the premises in what I have identified as the 
background argument for indeterminacy. But it must al o be combined with holism to render the 
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conclusion plausible, and we must also reflect on Quine’s naturalism in order to fully appreciate 
the coherence of the indeterminacy thesis. However, S arle also makes the mistake of identifying 
behaviorism as a mere assumption of Quine’s, whereas my account suggests that thereis in fact 
an argument for behaviorism implicit in Quine’s writings leading up to and including the first 
chapter of Word & Object.  
According to Searle, “[i]f behaviorism were true, then certain distinctions known 
independently to be valid would be lost” (Searle 1987, p. 124). Searle cites as an example the 
“distinction between [a speaker’s] meaning rabbit and his meaning rabbit stage or undetached 
rabbit part” (Searle 1987, p. 124). Searle refers to this example as a distinction that “we all know” 
(Searle 1987, p. 124). Searle provides no explanatio  of how it is that we all know this 
distinction, but rather takes it for granted. Most curiously, Searle’s use of the phrase ‘known 
independently’ is never explained, either. It is not at all clear from what we are supposed to be 
independent as we know these distinctions. Since a major aspect of Quine’s position rests on his 
naturalism, which states that we are in fact never independent of some conceptual scheme, 
working theory, or theoretical standpoint, it is cru ial that Searle be quite explicit in explaining 
what it is that he claiming when he says that we know these distinctions “independently”. 
Otherwise he appears to be simply begging the question against Quine’s naturalism.   
As Searle reflects on the behavioristic mechanism of stimulus and response employed by 
Quine’s field linguist, he finds it insufficient to explain our everyday semantic abilities: “…if all 
there were to meaning were patterns of stimulus and response, then it would be impossible to 
discriminate meanings, which are in fact discriminable. That is the reductio ad absurdum” (Searle 
1987, p. 125). Again, Searle does not offer any explanation on how it is that meanings are 
discriminable, which is rather a shame. Given Quine’s policy of “no entity without identity”, 
some specific insight on how it is that we discriminate meanings could meet Quine’s challenge, at 
which point he would have to admit meanings as entiti s, and the entire problem of indeterminacy 
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would simply vanish. Rather, Searle appears to be satisfied that our common sense intuition that 
we can individuate meanings as absolute matters of fact will vindicate his position. But Quine is 
discussing a scientific approach to the study of language. The history of science is riddled with 
“common sense” ideas that have turned out to be deeply flawed. Intuition alone is not enough.  
Searle illustrates his reductio again in a slightly different form. First, he defines 
behaviorism as follows: “The objective reality of meaning consists entirely of correlations 
between external stimuli and dispositions to verbal behavior” (Searle 1987, p. 126). He goes on to 
say, then, that “[i]f behaviorism were correct, it would have to be correct for us as speakers of 
English as well as for speakers of Gavagai-talk” (Searle 1987, p. 126). At this point, Searle 
introduces the “first person case”. We know in our wn cases what we mean when we say 
‘rabbit’, as opposed to ‘rabbit-stage’, or ‘undetached rabbit part’. If this is true for us, then it must 
also be true for the natives. Therefore there must be some fact of the matter. But behaviorism 
implies that there is no such fact of the matter. Thus, behaviorism is false. And if behaviorism is 
false, then our background argument for indeterminacy clearly fails.  
The “first person case” continues to be the primary focus of Searle’s argument 
throughout the rest of the essay. He develops this approach further by focusing on the absurdity 
of the consequences of inscrutability. The primary tension is this: we know, in our cases, what we 
mean when use terms such as ‘rabbit’. We know what e are referring to, and it is a plain fact. 
But if inscrutability is true, the reference is not even fixed in one’s own case. There is no real 
difference between one’s meaning rabbit, rabbit-stage, or undetached rabbit part when one uses 
the term ‘rabbit’. The absurdity of this conclusion, says Searle, is that if it is true, then there is no 
way that anyone could have possibly understood the previous sentence. If inscrutability is true, 
then there is no coherent way of communicating the thesis:  
If the indeterminacy thesis were really true, we would not even be able to understand 
its formulation; for when we were told there was no ‘fact of the matter’ about the 
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correctness of the translation between rabbit and rbbit stage, we would not have 
been able to hear any (objectively real) difference between the two English 
expressions to start with. (Searle 1987, p. 131) 
Searle recognizes the response that Quine has given to this objection. Quine argued by 
way of analogy with the theory of relativity: 
It is meaningless to ask whether, in general, our terms “rabbit,” “rabbit part,” 
“number,” etc., really refer respectively to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc., rather 
than to some ingeniously permuted denotations. It is meaningless to ask this 
absolutely; we can meaningfully ask it only relative to some background language. 
When we ask, “Does ‘rabbit’ really refer to rabbits?” someone can counter with the 
question: “Refer to rabbits in what sense of ‘rabbits’?” thus launching a regress; and 
we need the background language to regress into. The background language gives the 
query sense, if only relative sense; sense relative in turn to it, this background 
language. Querying reference in any more absolute way ould be like asking 
absolute position, or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a 
given frame of reference. (Quine 1969a, pg. 48-49) 
So, just as there is no empirical sense in casting about for absolute position in space, likewise 
there is no empirical sense in asking what the meaning of a word or sentence is independent of 
any particular language or theory. That is to say, the notion of language-transcendent meaning is 
itself meaningless. All meaning is relative to the language being utilized at the time. The same 
applies for questions of reference as well. Hence the term ‘ontological relativity’. Thus when we 
take ourselves to be referring to rabbits when we use the term ‘rabbits’, we are simply 
“acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking its words at face value” (Quine 1969a, p. 49).  
 Searle rejects this response, however, arguing that it merely “repeats the problem without 
solving it” (Searle 1987, p. 132). His objection is that this solution does nothing to affect the 
arbitrariness of our selection of which language to take at “face value”. This is the same problem, 
Searle argues, with the indeterminacy of translation. We can only arbitrarily select one translation 
manual over another, since both are equally compatible with all the possible empirical evidence. 
It is this arbitrariness, apparently, which is responsible for the absurdity of Quine’s thesis.  
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 Searle constructs a thought experiment to illustrate his point. He imagines that he is 
driving with two French friends, Henri and Pierre. Searle sees a rabbit along the road and 
announces, “There’s a rabbit”. Henri and Pierre are not familiar with the English term ‘rabbit’. 
They each attempt to translate this term into their own language. Henri settles on stade de lapin, 
while Pierre chooses parti non-détachée d’un lapin. Searle asserts, first, that based on certain 
assumptions about what the phrases mean in French, these are obviously bad translations. He 
asserts that it is “just a plain fact about me thatwhen I said ‘rabbit,’ I did not mean stade de lapin 
or parti non-détachée d’un lapin” (Searle 1987, p. 133). If those assumptions about the meaning 
of those French phrases are wrong, however, then  
Henri and Pierre are just right. That is, if, for example, Henri means by stade de lapin 
what I mean by lapin, then he understands me perfectly; he simply has an eccentric 
way of expressing this understanding. The important thi g to notice is that, in either 
case, whether they are right about my original meaning or I am right in thinking that 
they are wrong, there is a plain fact of the matter to be right or wrong about. (Searle 
1987, p. 134) 
 Once again, Searle makes several “common sense” asrtions about linguistic meaning 
without much by way of support for these assertions. Furthermore, Searle is so incapable of 
separating himself from his intuitive conception of meaning that he cannot even consistently 
formulate his own thought experiment. If we actually grant for the sake of argument that Searle is 
wrong about the meaning of Henri and Pierre’s chosen translations, then it makes no sense to turn 
around and say that “if… Henri means by stade de lapin what I mean by lapin, then he 
understands me perfectly” (Searle 1987, p. 134). This is simply to once again grant the original 
assumptions about the meanings of these French phrases. There is no basis for supposing that 
these phrases are in fact synonymous without those as umptions about French meaning. 
Ironically, Searle’s inability to coherently present his thought experiment here actually illustrates 
the relativity of meaning and reference quite well.  
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 Searle then returns to the analogy with relativity theory, and enlists the aid of Henri and 
Pierre once more. While they are again out driving, Henri estimates that the car is driving at 60 
miles an hour, while Pierre estimates that they are driving at 5 miles an hour. Resolving this 
disagreement requires recognizing that Henri was using the frame of reference of the road, while 
Pierre was using the frame of reference of a truck that they were passing. Thus their estimates 
were actually quite consistent, once the background assumptions have been identified. Searle 
accepts this kind of relativity, but he does not see the analogy successfully carrying over into 
semantics: “…are they analogously both right about the translation of ‘rabbit’ once the coordinate 
systems have been identified? Is it a case of moving at different semantic speeds relative to 
different linguistic coordinate systems? It seems to me that these absurdities are just as absurd 
when relativized” (Searle 1987, p. 134). 
 Why, precisely, does Searle feel that the absurdity persists? For two reasons: first, he 
continues to maintain that “the problem we are trying to deal with is that we know independently 
that both of their translation manuals are just plain wrong” (Searle 1987, p. 135). Once again, an 
explanation of how it is that we know this, and in what sense this knowledge is “independent”, is 
not given. Second, Searle thinks that the analogy breaks down because meaning is not relative to 
language in the same way that motion or position is relative to a frame of reference or coordinate 
system: 
In physics the position and motion of a body consist entirely in its relations to some 
coordinate system; but there is more to meaning than just the relations that a word 
has to the language of which it is a part; otherwise the question of translation could 
never arise in the first place. We can’t detach the sp cific motion or position of an 
object from a reference to a specific coordinate system and translate it into another 
system in the way we can detach a specific meaning from a specific linguistic system 
and find an expression that has that very meaning in another linguistic system. 
(Searle 1987, p. 135) 
The last sentence of the above quotation is a telling one, for it reveals that Searle is not so 
much arguing against indeterminacy as much as he is simply repeatedly asserting, in various 
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paraphrases, that the indeterminacy of translation is false. To say that we can “detach a specific 
meaning from a specific linguistic system and find an expression that has that very meaning in 
another linguistic system” is just to admit meanings as language-transcendent entities within our 
ontology. But this is merely the denial of the conclusion of Quine’s argument. Other than Searle’s 
consistent appeals to common sense, “independent” knowledge of one’s own meaning, he has 
given no argumentative support for the conclusion that he indeterminacy thesis is false. Rather, it 
seems that Searle’s examples depend on the falsity of indeterminacy, rather than attempting to 
support it.  
If Searle could be more specific about how exactly we detach these meanings and find 
synonymous phrases in other language, or about what it is that we are doing when we “know in 
our own case” what we mean by our words, or about what it means to know such things 
“independently”, then his argument might actually have some force. Unfortunately, the only 
further details that Searle offers is that “when we understand someone else or ourselves, what we 
require—among other things—is a knowledge of intentional contents” (Searle 1987, p. 146). 
Searle does not tell us what he means by this, either, other than that it is not equivalent to a 
behaviorist account of meaning. Searle’s argument, then, appears to be not much more than a 
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